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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The state of democracy in the Dominican Republic cannot be
analyzed exclusively according to how closely its
institutional functions and procedures conform to classic
ideals of representative democracy. Instead, the Dominican
Republic can perhaps best be described as a “contested
democracy” in acknowledgement of certain of its
characteristics: informal forms of citizenship, conflicting
governability, and precarious institutionalization.
The
quality of its democracy must be viewed in the context of its
ability to offer basic civil guarantees, such as access to
security and social justice. This paper focuses primarily on
these factors, which determine actual governability in the
Dominican Republic.
An understanding of the challenges facing Dominican
democracy requires an examination at the structural and
policy levels.
The issues to be considered include
mechanisms for the resolution of conflicting interests among
actors with asymmetrical access to power, as well as the
resilience of nondemocratic institutional cultures within the
police, political parties and other key institutions. Such
conditions typically inhibit democracy but could be
redirected to reach the “positive equilibrium” that John
Bailey discusses elsewhere.
Security and judicial policies tend to be directed from the top
down, but an official attitude that recognizes and nurtures
local initiatives and reforms that involve a variety of
strategic stakeholders could be more effective. Similarly, the
Dominican state must take greater efforts to identify positive
role models at the local and national levels, starting by
See John Bailey, "Security Traps and Democratic Governability in
Latin America: Dynamics of Crime, Violence, Corruption, Regime and
State," in Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Criminality,
Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 2009.
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establishing a more responsible law enforcement system that
guarantees fair sanctions against predators and compensation
to the victims of criminal acts. These steps could have a
dramatic impact on curbing violence, crime and injustice.
The greatest challenge for the Dominican state, however, is
to disrupt the growing nexus between criminal elements and
political, economic and governmental actors.
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THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY
Many scholars consider Latin American democracies to be
“works in progress” due to the regimes‟ hybridism or even
schizophrenia in terms of objectives and content, and,
ultimately, quality and performance. Flawed democracies
are commonly associated with various forms of violence
which, while they differ from the predominantly political
violence states used against citizens under previous
authoritarian regimes, complement the re-creation of
discriminatory state violence against socially deprived
sectors. Contemporary violence, most often citizen against
citizen, occurs within a faulty system of law enforcement
and civil guarantees, but it also derives from violent methods
of social cleansing implemented by governments in fighting
crime. Confrontations between angry, frustrated and/or
marginalized citizens against their governments and political
elites sometimes overshadow the recurrent violence wielded
by politicians against their opponents.
In this
“democratization of violence,” to use Dirk Kruijt and Kees
Koonings‟ term, a “variety of social actors pursuing a variety
of objectives act on the basis of coercive strategies and
methods.”2 Publicly and privately, violent actors move in to
areas where ineffective local governance has left a vacuum,
legal authorities are absent and the rule of law is precarious.
These conditions operate not on the margins of
contemporary democratic regimes, but at their very center,
striking at core values.

2

Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings, “Introduction: Violence and Fear in
Latin America,” in Koonings and Kruijt, eds., Societies of Fear, the
Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America (London:
Zed Books, 1999), 11. See also Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, “Armed
Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A
Survey of Issues and Arguments,” in Koonings and Kruijt, eds., Armed
Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America (London:
Zed Books, 2004), 8.
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How does this picture fit into understandings of what
democracy is or means? In general terms, the debate
regarding contemporary democracy in Latin America can be
simplified into two camps: On the one side, the promoters of
a minimalist conception of procedural democracy in the
tradition of Schumpeter‟s (1950) and Robert Dahl‟s (1971)
polyarchic conception of political participation; and, on the
other, critics of the objectification of existing democracies.
Some scholars consider Dahl‟s and Schumpeter‟s theories to
be examples of elitist democracy. More than three decades
after the end of a generation of dictatorships and
totalitarianism, these critics argue, elected governments have
not been able to eradicate fraud, clientelism or pacts among
political elites based on corruption and “opacity.” 3 In this
vein, Linz and Stepan emphasize the discrepancy between
political elites‟ values and behavior and the legitimating
procedures and formal structures necessary to protect the
collective interest.4 Such procedures and structures validate
the limited power legitimately delegated to political elites
and should translate, in the words of John Bailey and Roy
Godson, into the democratic exercise of governability: “the
ability of a government to allocate values over its society, to
exercise legitimate power in the context of generally
accepted rules.”5 For Bailey in particular, various indicators
serve as measurements of democratic governability: a) the
separation between public and private interests and activity;
3

See James Petras and Steve Vieux, “The Transition to Authoritarian
Electoral Regimes in Latin America,” Latin American Perspectives 21
no. 4, 1994, http://lap.sagepub.com/content/21/4/5.full.pdf+html.
4
See Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and
Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1996).
5
John Bailey and Roy Godson, “Introduction,” in Bailey and Godson,
eds., Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the
U.S.-Mexican Borderland (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2000).
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b) concordance, rather than separation, between the letter of
the law and social practice; and c) citizens‟ preference for
legal transactions over illegal ones. To these concepts we
should add the state‟s ability to prevent and protect citizens
from social, political and unregulated violence. From the
perspective of liberal democracy, the precarious balance, or
“negative equilibrium,” of these factors in Latin America and
the Caribbean renders its democratic track record more
aspirational than real.6 Political scientists, in fact, have
labeled many of these regimes “non-liberal democracies.” 7
Critics of the objectification of existing democracies argue
that Latin American democracies reconstitute themselves in
practice through formal and informal channels concurrently
with the erosion of civil liberties, preservation of vestiges of
authoritarianism or populism, and increasingly precarious
social conditions for the majority of citizens.
Such
democracies operate within a framework of increasing
insecurity and entrenched official impunity that
compromises quality of life. Guillermo O‟Donnell notes a
kind of authoritarian/democratic hybridism among the
emerging African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean
democracies, describing them as having an asymmetric state
presence incapable of guaranteeing the rule of law within
their territories.8
This line of thinking has led to a focus on the processes by
which criminal and violent agents take over government
institutions and permeate society, conditioning the limits of

6

Bailey, "Security Traps.”
See Carlos A. Flores, El estado en crisis: crimen organizado y política,
Desafíos para la consolidación democrática (Mexico City: CIESAS,
2009).
8
See Guillermo O‟Donnell, “On the State, Democratization and Some
Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some
Postcommunist Countries,” World Development 21, no. 8, 1993.
7
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democratic regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean. 9
In such settings, state power is co-opted, ceded or shared
with non-state, sometimes criminal and violent, actors.
Rather than a lack of institutional presence in the strict sense
of the term, these societies are characterized by the
emergence of alternative authorities, actors and arbiters that
renegotiate power, both public and private, formal and
informal, licit and illicit.10 Elke Krahmann suggests the
meaning of governance in these states: “the fragmentation of
political authority in seven dimensions: geography, function,
resources, interests, norms, decision making and policy
implementation. Together they help to distinguish
governance from government as ideal concepts of
fragmented and centralized political authority.” 11 These
dynamics obviously complicate the rules and framework of
democracy. At the very least, the state loses its exclusive
control over the legitimate use of violence – the basic
definition of a state, as Max Weber and Thomas Hobbes
proposed.
Explaining the evolution of Latin American states into their
current form is also a challenge. Bailey describes a pattern
of “negative equilibrium”12 around dynamics toxic to
9

See Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro:
Trafficking, Social Networks & Public Security (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2006). See also Luis Jorge Garay S., et al.,
Drug Trafficking, Corruption and States: How Illicit Networks
Reconfigure Institutions in Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico (Bogotá:
Fundación Método, 2011).
10
See Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces:
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010).
11
Elke Krahmann, “National, Regional, and Global Governance: One
Phenomenon or Many?” Global Governance 9, no. 3 (2003): 323-346.
12
John Bailey proposes a two way (polarized) model of interaction
between public security and democratic governability: on the one hand, a
positive equilibrium in which “the state and regime operate mostly
legally and in the main to ameliorate problems of public security”; and
on the other, a “negative equilibrium, where there is a marked
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institutional strengthening: rampant corruption, criminal
violence, and the endemic weakness of justice and security
systems.13 Other social scientists claim that the multiplicity
of violence is not a sign of the failure of the region‟s political
systems but rather a creative force engendering distinctive
systems of governability. 14
Desmond Arias and Daniel Goldstein suggest that
contemporary democracies can only be understood through a
historical analysis of the political practices, cultures and
institutions leading to the conflation of illicit actors and state
agents.15 In my view, terms such as “violent democracies,”
“neo-medievalisms” and emergent “alternative authorities”
may seem like oxymorons, but in fact they reflect the
concrete realities of Latin American democratic states and
regimes.16 For a large number of emerging or evolving
democracies, violence precedes and accompanies processes
of social change and modernization. Understanding Latin
American democracies, therefore, means understanding the
interaction of these social and political components in ways
that constantly redefine the relations between state and
society, processes of integration and exclusion, formal and
informal institutions, violence and crime. Tensions and
ruptures within contemporary democratic regimes, even if
they do not manifest themselves in the revolutions and coups
discrepancy between formal law and norms of civil society behavior,
where citizenry tolerate or promote formally illegal exchanges and the
state and regime act as principal engines of crime, violence and
corruption.” Bailey, “Security Traps,” 253-256.
13
Ibid., 260-261
14
See Enrique Desmond Arias, “Understanding Security Networks,
Political Order, and Politics in Latin America,” in Anne Clunan and
Harold Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces, 116.
15
Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein, Violent
Democracies in Latin America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2010).
16
For an exploration of these concepts see Arias and Goldstein, Violent
Democracies; Clunan and Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces; John Rapley,
“The New Middle Ages,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (May/June 2006).
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of earlier eras, reflect countersystemic tendencies that
challenge and undermine democratic liberal principles and
aspirations, as is evident in the recent experiences of
countries such as Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela. A
process of “negative adaptation” characterizes these cases, as
political elites attempt different subterfuges to withstand
challenges to their interests, including constitutional reforms
as a means of arbitration.
The same process of “negative adaptation” exists in the
Caribbean, this essay argues, in contrast to some analysts‟
favorable views of the robustness of democracy in the region
in post-colonial, post-authoritarian and parliamentary
guise.17 A critical element of this outlook is the health of the
political party system, especially in the Dominican Republic.
Countries with a tradition of centralized (presidential)
governments, such as the Dominican Republic (which
inaugurated the democratic boom in Latin America in the
late 1970s), suffer from chronic institutional deficits
including lack of bureaucratic transparency, excessive use of
17

Ivelaw Griffith maintains that: “With some notable exceptions, such as
Cuba and Haiti, the contemporary history of the Caribbean reveals the
region to be a bastion of democracy both in terms of elections and in
terms of press freedom, human rights protections, and other key
democracy variables. Especially in the English-speaking Caribbean the
endurance of democracy is partly due to the possession of strong
„democratic assets,‟ compared to societies in other parts of the world
with similar socio-economic profiles.” See U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, New Directions or Old Path? Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
2009). See also Jorge I. Dom nguez, “The Caribbean Question, Why
Has Liberal Democracy (Surprisingly) Flourished?” in Jorge I.
Domínguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. DeLisle Worrell, eds., Democratic
Politics in Latin America and the Caribbean (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 14; and Anthony Harriot, “Police
Transformation and International Cooperation: The Jamaican
Experience,” in Niels Uildriks, Policing Insecurity: Police Reform,
Security, and Human Rights in Latin America (Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2009), 23.
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coercive force against citizens, and the absence of clear
public policies regulating the relationship between state and
society and citizens themselves.18 Despite the superficial
vitality of political parties in the Dominican Republic, the
political class shows an increasing incapacity to establish
basic consensus around critical issues of public interest or to
form strategies and policies of governance. This shortcoming
seriously threatens democratic governability by reducing the
capacity of the governed to question those who govern them,
as well as diminishing public trust in democratic institutions.
SECURITY AND JUSTICE: CRUCIAL COMPONENTS IN
A DEMOCRACY
The fundamental importance of the safety of person and
property, and the principle of equal treatment under the law,
make security and justice crucial components in the
performance and endurance of democracy. Several factors
measure a state‟s success in providing these values: (a) a
collective sense of safety and fairness; and (b) the existence
of formal channels enabling citizens to participate in the
process of institutional reform. For decades, aspirations
toward security and justice have propelled social agency and
guided collective action around the world, but in democratic
regimes they come together and can become problematic. A
rights-based, democratic state project that guarantees social
welfare accords security and justice the same value as
18

See Rosario Espinal, “El proceso democrático dominicano: avances,
retrocesos y riesgos,” in Robinson Salazar, ed., Los riesgos de la
democracia en América Latina (Mexico City: Editorial Libros en Red,
2003). See also
Catherine M. Conaghan and Rosario Espinal, “Unlikely Transitions to
Uncertain Regimes? Democracy without Compromise in the Dominican
Republic and Ecuador” (University of Notre Dame: Kellogg Working
Paper no. 139, May 1990). For an analysis of the implications for
democratic regimes see Lee J. Alston, Thráinn Eggertsson, and Douglass
Cecil North, Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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economic and social welfare; that is, as basic factors for the
consolidation of a democratic regime. The construction of
this new institutionalism requires recognition that the
asymmetric structure of society leaves out or, more to the
point, informally incorporates certain social groups; for
example, underprivileged youth, whose social and political
marginalization can result, in turn, in their criminalization.
In such societies, the political rhetoric of democracy,
elevated to national discourse, has little connection to the
restricted political rights exercised by poor, “second-class”
citizens.19
In countries such as the Dominican Republic, the
construction of citizenship and the consolidation of the rule
of law mediate between offer and demand in the areas of
justice and security. The democratization of security and
justice can be viewed from three perspectives, therefore: (1)
as a fundamental prerogative of citizens; (2) as a standard for
measuring the strength of a state‟s institutions; and (3) as a
measure of the quality and maturity of a democracy. The
deterioration of citizens‟ security, in turn, owes a great deal
to increased levels of violence and criminal penetration of
the state.
The discussion that follows begins with a brief overview of
the recent history of democracy in the Dominican Republic,
focusing primarily on the tensions between the democratic
state and society. It examines public attitudes toward and
expectations of the state‟s and government‟s ability to
provide safety, fairness and protection. The data comes from
Latinobarómetro and Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) surveys.

19

This issue was an integral part of the peace negotiations to end the civil
conflicts in Central America in the mid 1990s. A shift in the security
paradigm occurred within the framework of state restructuring and social
and political recomposition in these countries.

10

THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONALISM
The Dominican Republic is widely considered to be one of
the most stable examples of democracy in the hemisphere
since the country‟s post-authoritarian transition in the late
1970s.20 Its stability may be related to the absence of military
governments for more than half a century and the decline in
the political clout of the armed forces. Accepting this
scenario at face value, however, glosses over an important
fact: The country‟s transition from a civilian but
authoritarian regime did not involve a decisive rupture with
previous political and military elites.
The transition to
democracy in the Dominican Republic was characterized by
the continuity of a culture of centralized power, coercion and
personalism. This elitist model of transition, based on pacts
that can be traced back to the end of the Trujillo regime,
ensured either alternation or continuity in power, and tended
to replicate itself during successive episodes of political
change (with the exception of the 1965 revolutionary
moment), perpetuating these actors‟ dominance of state
power structures and granting them impunity.
The transition from authoritarianism to democracy in a
context of institutional precariousness had a double effect.
On the one hand, the disarticulation of state agencies, despite
the centralizing power of the executive, accentuated the lack
of coordination within the bureaucracy and fomented the
privatization of basic state functions, including justice and
security. This in turn incentivized the autonomy of public
actors working for their own benefit. On the other hand, as
was noted above, the transition maintained the continuity of
past practices, especially relating to security. Successive
20

Jana Morgan, Rosario Espinal, and Mitchell Seligson, Cultura política
de la democracia en República Dominicana, 2010: consolidación
democrática en las Américas en tiempos difíciles (Santo Domingo:
USAID/Santo Domingo, 2010), 29-30.
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governments transferred critical responsibilities to the
security forces, making them the absolute designers,
controllers and promoters of their roles and missions.
The delegation of security policy to the security forces
drastically limited citizen‟s ability to check and balance the
security and judicial sectors.
Even the process of
“liberalization” that accompanied the emergence of
Dominican democracy failed to reconfigure critical state
attributes. The absence of public security policies is an
example of one such vacuum, made worse by the lack of an
effective, professional and accountable security bureaucracy.
These impediments have blocked Dominicans‟ aspirations
for truly democratic reform of the security and justice
sectors.
Political and institutional changes have only accentuated the
adversarial relationship between the state, the emerging
political system and Dominican society. Of course, some
segments of civil society have been able to take advantage of
opportunities to promote their common interests, channel
collective
action
and
contribute
to
democratic
institutionalism. 21 An extensive literature addresses these
processes;22 fewer works, however, explore their underlying

21

See Lilian Bobea, “De la protesta a la propuesta: articulaciones entre
los movimientos populares y el estado en República Dominicana,” in
Margarita López Maya, ed., Lucha popular, democracia, neoliberalismo:
protesta popular en América Latina en los años de ajuste (Caracas:
Nueva Sociedad, 1999), 179-208. See also Laura Faxas, El mito roto:
sistema político y movimiento popular en la República Dominicana,
1961-1990 (Mexico City: Ediciones Siglo XXI, FUNGLODE, FLACSO
República Dominicana, 2007); and César Pérez and Leopoldo Artiles,
Movimientos sociales dominicanos: identidad y dilemas (Santo
Domingo: Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 1992).
22
For a more complete review of these issues see Rosario Espinal,
Autoritarismo y democracia en la política dominicana (San Jos , Costa
Rica: Editorial Argumentos, 1987); Rosario Espinal, “Republica
Dominicana. El retorno del PRD al poder,” Revista Nueva Sociedad 178
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dynamics, and their implications for the formal and informal
institutionalism that shapes and sustains governability.
Neither NGOs nor social movements (i.e. popular protests)
have done much to change the essence of civil society‟s
confrontational relationship with the state and the political
system, whose underlying rationale is precisely
dissatisfaction with a system lacking constructive
mechanisms to channel popular discontent and contestation.
As other Dominican scholars, have noted, however, the
emergence of informal politics not only changed the
discourse of the masses (from a concept of social class to one
of popular struggle), but also contributed to democratization
based on the rights of citizens. This is something that the
disorganized and debilitated state was in no condition to
offer.23
THE “RULERS AND SHAKERS” OF THE NEW
DEMOCRACY
Although elections offer a space for negotiation that would
seem to facilitate popular pressure for reform, Dominican
political parties have usually operated with a binary logic of
cooptation followed by distancing;24 one they attain power,
in other words, they cease to serve and represent the masses.
That trend creates a rupture between the government and the
governed, fueling a repetitive cycle of expectation, distrust
and loss of legitimacy. At the same time, the neoliberal state
has transferred responsibilities to non-state actors (churches,
NGOs, the private sector) and, by doing so, eroded its raison
d’être as the main guarantor of basic rights and social justice.
(2002), 15-22; Conaghan and Espinal, “Unlikely Transitions"; and Faxas,
El Mito Roto.
23
See Pérez and Artiles, Movimientos sociales.
24
The greatest momentum for political change took place in 1996, when
the newly elected liberal government of Leonel Fernández introduced
state reform that included reform of the justice system and the election of
the country‟s first-ever independent Supreme Court.
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To what extent, however, do civil society innovations bypass
inefficient state institutions? And can the system of political
and institutional representation within the state be enhanced
to invigorate democracy in the Dominican Republic?
Centripetal and centrifugal forces in the links between
society, state and politics require an examination of the
interactions and engagements among these components,
especially with regard to the provision of security and civil
guarantees.
The Dominican public is not completely apathetic with
regard to cooperation with the security forces, in spite of the
negative record of police-civilian relations.25 Only 37% of
Dominicans had a positive opinion of the country‟s security
forces in 2010;26 nevertheless, around 75% of residents
interviewed in the poorest neighborhood of Santo Domingo
in 2006 said they would collaborate with the police and
Ministry of Interior in crime prevention in despite the
widespread perception (90% of those interviewed) of
unequal treatment by these institutions. The overwhelming
perception of insecurity among Dominicans – one of the
highest in Latin America, along with Venezuela, El Salvador
and Ecuador – could explain this inconsistency.27
A SYSTEM THAT WORKS OR JUST ANOTHER DEAD
END?
Another factor to consider in the ambiguous relationship
between the state and its citizens is the importance
25

See Lilian Bobea, “Organized Violence, Disorganized States,” in
Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein, eds., Violent
Democracies in Latin America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2010).
26
t
r etr (Madrid: Banco de Datos ASEP/JDS, 2010),
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/latinobarometro.jsp.
27
According to the 2010 Latinobarómetro poll, only 26% of Dominicans
feel secure in the country and in their neighborhoods. Latinobarómetro
(2010), 95.
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Dominicans place on institutional performance. Dominicans
rank second after Venezuelans among Latin Americans in
believing that the state has the capacity to solve problems. 28
Despite this prima facie vote of confidence in state
institutionalism, however, Dominican political culture
remains characterized by a considerable degree of
clientelism and personalism, as well as presidentialism.
Further evidence of this “executive” orientation is the degree
of trust Dominicans express in the head of state (69%) over
political parties (33%), or key institutions such as the
police.29 Even given a strong party system, clientelism
reinforces the personalist nature of Dominican politics,
favoring a strong government hand (authoritarian or
militaristic) in administrative, economic and, especially,
security crises. Sixty percent of Dominicans consider it
acceptable for the government to overrule laws, Congress
and democratic institutions to solve problems, a far greater
percentage than the Latin American average (39%).30
“Executivist” democracies reflect a rupture between norms
concerning the rule of law and actual practice and, in turn,
call into question the robustness of the political system and
democratic regime. The subordination of the state as the
universal representative of the rights of citizens to the
political power personified by the party leadership inevitably
erodes the legitimacy of the constitutional order. Between
2008 and 2010, indices of support for the democratic system
and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy decreased
on several counts in the Dominican Republic, accompanied
by parallel increases in support for the benefits of

28

Latinobar metro (2010).
Morgan, et al., Cultura política de la democracia en República
Dominicana, 2010, 31.
30
Latinobarómetro (2010), 37.
29
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authoritarianism in ensuring security and the statement that
Dominican democracy was at risk.31
These results are a sign of frustration with the way the
system operates and may reflect a process of “negative
adaptation” of citizens to current sociopolitical conditions.
As we have seen, despite Dominicans‟ commitment to
democracy, their support for democratic forms of
government has eroded in recent years, along with their
satisfaction with the democratic regime.32 The indicators
used in comparative surveys reveal a negative view of
institutional performance, especially with regard to the
provision of justice and security and efforts to reduce
corruption.33 LAPOP‟s 2010 AmericasBarometer poll, for
example, compared average support for the political system
with questions about such issues as the “likelihood that the
courts of justice would deliver a fair judgment”; “respect of
citizens toward the political institutions of the country”; “if
they considered that their basic rights were safeguarded by
the political system”; the “extent to which they felt proud of
living under such a political system”; and their confidence in
the system. Although 53.9% of Dominicans answered these
questions positively, the results represented a 4% drop from
2008. Nearly half of respondents indicated that the political
system did not meet their expectations, and their answers
reflect a growing sense of unfairness, especially with regard
to access to justice.
Since 2000, the Dominican Republic has experienced
positive institutional change, most notably in the sphere of
31

Morgan, et al., Cultura política de la democracia en República
Dominicana, 2010, 58-59.
32
According to the most recent Latinobarómetro poll, 63% of
Dominicans declared their support for democracy in 2010, down from
67% in 2009 and 75% in 2008.
33
Morgan, et al., Cultura política de la democracia en República
Dominicana, 2010.
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justice. The process has included the modernization of the
criminal justice system, including the penal system; the
development of a more democratic legal framework;
protection for individual rights through the revision of the
Penal Process Code; more extensive training for judges; and
the development of alternative mechanisms of conflict
resolution, such as neighborhood and community
prosecutors.34 Many problems with the justice system
remain, however, especially with regard to access to the
resources that provide these guarantees.
For example, in the National District – the capital and its
environs – drug violations represent 40% of all infractions.
Most of these violations involve a myriad of minor street
dealers and drug users, meaning that the criminal justice
system spends a disproportionate amount of time prosecuting
economically disadvantaged segments of the population that
depend on informal illicit economies to survive.35 In the
words of one NGO representative: “The majority of people
convicted in this matter generally are not the kingpin or
high-ranking leaders but instead people who are used as
„mules‟ and ultimately people who do not have the capacity
to pay for legal assistance.”36 The prosecutor for the

34

It is worthwhile mentioning the role of the Oficina Nacional de la
Defensa Pública (ONDP), which by 2008 was responsible for 63%
(22,183) of total cases entering the judicial system. Of this number,
3,417 were resolved, 5,850 were inconclusive and 7,888 were still
pending. During the first half of 2009 the ONDP handled around 72% of
the more than 14,000 cases that entered the penal system. See Kaelis
Bautista, “Casos de droga predominan en la defensa pública,” Clave
Digital, November 29, 2009.
35
Oficina Nacional de Defensa Pública (ONDP).
36
Remarks by a member of the Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia
(FINJUS) and the National Public Defense Council. Another renowned
jurist voiced similar opinions, noting, “usually the accused with meager
resources are the ones who make use of public defense and consequently
one has to assume that there is a high percentage of lower-class youth
involved in drug crime.” See, Kaeilis Bautista, “Casos de Droga
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National District corroborated the fact that “the majority of
the important cases of narcotrafficking in the National
District are conducted by private lawyers; the ones that make
the headlines, all have private defense.”37 Cases that involve
individuals with few resources are handled by the National
Public Defense Office (Oficina Nacional de Defensa Pública,
ONDP), which in 2009 had only 184 public defense
attorneys despite the high demand generated by such cases,
which constitute 60% of all criminal cases in the Dominican
Republic and should employ at least 400 public defense
attorneys.
Exceedingly high levels of impunity compromise the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the justice system, which is
lenient toward public functionaries who have committed
fraud as well as toward individuals in the private sector who
engage in acts of corruption. A 2003 study by the
Dominican Republic‟s Foundation for Institutionality and
Justice (FINJUS) found that of 130 corruption cases that
went to trial, only six ended in judicial decisions and only
one in non-jail sanctions against the accused. “In the last 20
years,” the study concluded, “nobody has received a criminal
The impunity of corrupt
conviction for corruption.”38
officials stands in stark contrast to the vulnerability of petty
drug dealers and exposes a double standard in the criminal
justice system. These phenomena cannot be attributed only
to institutional failures, but also to an institutional culture
that functions according to an inverse, or even perverse logic
of subsuming the collective interest to the individual.

Predominan en la Defensa Publica. Clave Digital, Dominican Republic,
11/29/2009. www.clavedigital.com.do (accessed by 1/20/2010)
37
Ibid.
38
See Isis Duarte and Joel Arboleda, “La visi n de la poblaci n usuaria:
resultados de la Encuesta a Personas Usuarias de la Justicia Penal
Dominicana” (FINJUS, Participaci n Ciudadana, Enjus, 2006),
http://www.finjus.net/documentos/Archivos/Documentos/Libros/Vision
%20Poblacion%20Justicia%20Penal.pdf
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Dissatisfaction with security conditions is also rampant in
the Dominican Republic. In 2010, only 7% of Dominicans
surveyed believed that national security was good or very
good, a figure nine points below the Latin American average
(16%).39 In part this can be explained by a “shock effect”;
after enjoying levels of violence below the rest of Latin
America for many years, Dominican society registered a
sharp rise in violent deaths beginning in 2001.40 The number
of homicide victims more than doubled, from 12.8 per
100,000 inhabitants in 2001 to 26.3 per 100,000 in 2006.41
To face this crisis of insecurity, President Leonel Fernández
(1996-2000 and 2004-2012) designed and implemented a
public policy known as the Democratic Security Plan (Plan
de Seguridad Democrática, or PSD), which succeeded in
reducing the national rate of violent deaths from 25.2 per
100,000 inhabitants in 2004 to 22 per 100,000 in 2007. 42 By
2008, however, violent crime rates had crept back up,
especially in low-income neighborhoods.
These
developments fuel a culture of insecurity that emphasizes
self-protection among the poor and the privatization of
security among the rich. It reflects the disappointment of
early expectations, especially among the poor, that the state
could guarantee security through the PSD, and increased
public skepticism of its real capability to deal with macrosocial problems.
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See Morgan, et al., Cultura política de la democracia en República
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In recent surveys, Dominicans identify crime and insecurity
as more serious problems than poverty and unemployment. 43
The 2010 Latinobarómetro poll found a high perception of
insecurity among Dominicans of all social classes, who
believe that life in the country grows more dangerous every
day. Over the last few years, according to data from LAPOP
2010, the perception of insecurity has varied but remained
consistently elevated (68% in 2001; 75% in 2004; 79% in
2006; 59% in 2008; and 73% in 2010). 44 Only 10% of
Dominican citizens claim to feel safe in their own
neighborhoods, compared to 37% of Nicaraguans and 17%
of all Latin Americans. 45
Individual perceptions of
insecurity are also high among Dominicans, only 8% of
whom feel safe in assuming that they will never be the
victim of a crime (compared to 22% of Nicaraguans and
19% of Guatemalans).
Not surprisingly, rising fear of crime has coincided with
doubts about the police practices employed to counteract it.
More than 42% of those interviewed in 2006 believed that
the National Police did not adequately control delinquency.
Residents of the most populous and crime-ridden
neighborhoods of the National District interviewed in 2005
and 2007 expressed the same sentiment:
We are so fearful among ourselves that we cannot
face the criminals and given that the police do not
help us we find ourselves forced to make friends with
these criminals, that is, to be friendly with them, for if
we try to confront them they kill us and the police will
not do anything about it. 46
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By 2006, 16% of Dominicans reported having been the
victim of a crime.47 Fifty-six percent of these victims
admitted that they had not reported the crime to the police,
believing that it was “useless” to do so – up from 43% in
2004.48 In 2005, the government‟s official statistical survey,
ENHOGAR, revealed that 79% of home break-ins were not
reported to the police, along with 74% of holdups and 88%
of thefts. 49
The low rate of calling in the police is a clear indication of
public distrust both in the capacity (efficiency and
efficaciousness) and integrity of this institution. Forty-two
percent of the victims of auto part thefts agreed that “the
police will not do anything” to resolve such crimes, a
sentiment echoed by 58% of victims of vehicular theft and
71% of victims of burglaries.50 Another survey in 2006
revealed that 60% of Dominicans expressed little confidence
in the police,51 a situation often aggravated by fear.
Research conducted in the National District in 2005 found
overwhelming distrust of the authorities, in some cases as
high as 95%, depending on the specific history of conflict
between the neighborhood and the police. As some residents
stated:
You are safer if a delinquent robs you than if the
police bust you. The police bust you, plant drugs,
arrest you, open a criminal file, and give you two,
47
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three, or four years in jail, and you come out and you
are a parasite to society . . . Because you are from
Capotillo.52
WEAK INSTITUTIONS: CRIMINAL STATETROPISM
AND DOMINICAN DEMOCRACY
Dominican democracy is plagued by the links sustained by
bureaucrats and political elites with unregulated actors who
promote new forms of violent and illicit practices that are
often not only political, but also criminal. In interviews in
the barrios of Santo Domingo in 2005, poor residents spoke
of the social, political and economic changes that have
resulted from increased insecurity, pervasive drug trafficking
and police corruption in their neighborhoods. Some
individuals benefit from these activities, but overall they
have a negative impact on social capital and community
cohesion. Many informants stressed that they were afraid to
leave their houses after dark; changed their route to work to
avoid drug sales points and dangerous spaces; and restricted
the freedom of their children to protect them from violence.
Torn between intimidation by gang members and fear of the
police, many see neither in black and white terms. Public
security policies continue to dichotomize criminals and the
police, but the reality is that for the most vulnerable citizens,
illicit activity often has certain beneficial effects and official
security policy a negative impact. The same dynamic holds
true for police, judges, customs officials and military officers
drawn into illicit activity.
Given their lack of options, slum dwellers find ways to adapt
to the fear, violence and intimidation that drug gangs bring to
poor neighborhoods. Insofar as adaptation allows them to
overcome the absence of licit economic alternatives, it can
appear beneficial, but when citizens embrace values and
52
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identities that accept illicit and sometimes violent activities,
social cohesion and social capital grow weaker. From the
state perspective, the success of organized criminals in
providing poor neighborhoods with alternative forms of
security, livelihood, morality and even identity is a threat to
institutional democracy.
Unlike common criminals,
moreover, organized criminals actively seek out agents of the
state for co-optation.
This essay coins the term statetropism to describe the illicit
entrepreneurship of corrupt, often violent officials who
protect illicit businesses.53 Instead of confronting the state,
the new criminality builds a network of alliances within and
around it. The state is thereby put in the untenable position
of being responsible for deterring crime while at the same
time being exploited by an organized criminal elite.
Statetropism, in other words, institutionalizes complex
criminality within a putatively democratic system.
The new statetropic criminality is crucial to guaranteeing the
predictability and robustness of illicit businesses. In some
cases, it can function as a moderator of violence through the
rationalization and administration of illegal activities. 54 This
calming effect, however, may not trickle down to the street
level, where gang rivalries often erupt into violence. The
absence of professionalism within the ranks of the police
manifests itself in the wanton use of extra-legal force and
rampant corruption. The ability of the police leadership to
curb officer vigilantism is an indication of the systematic
nature of excessive police force, rather than the idiosyncratic
response of a few officers.
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National statistics corroborate the extent of official violence.
In the first year of the Plan for Democratic Security (20052006), the number of individuals killed by the police
dropped 33%, representing a decline in police shooting rates
from 4.80 per 100,000 inhabitants to 3.24 for the period.55
This decline was reversed in 2006, when a new police chief
took office. That year, the US State Department denounced
400 killings by police in the Dominican Republic. For the
last 10 years, police actions have caused between 16% and
20% of total violent deaths in the country.56
This situation is the result of a discriminatory system of
justice that punishes minor infractions with lethal force and
harsh penalties but barely sanctions white-collar crime. This
pattern relies on a double-track mechanism of dissuasion: on
one hand, a pervasive institutional culture that implements
the symbolic and conferred use of power under a system of
agreed-upon rules; and on the other hand, an informal and
autonomous system of rules stemming from institutional
disarticulation and disorganization. This implicit “strategy”
contradicts any democratic policy of crime prevention and
control but has served as the default components of a
semiofficial National Police policy. This approach has the
tacit and sometimes explicit support of influential groups
within Dominican society, who believe that only a mano
dura (strong hand) can control criminality. This tolerance
for military and police violence delays the development of an
effective counter-crime policy, even as it suggests that
democracy has little effect on transforming engrained
authoritarian practices.
Another enduring legacy of dictatorship is the pervasive
corruption among Dominican police and justice personnel. In
55

Datos del Ministerio Público, "Estadísticas," Procuraduría General de
la República Dominicana,
http://www.procuraduria.gov.do/PGR.NET/Estadisticas.aspx.
56
Ibid.

24

a 2006 penitentiary survey, 71.4% of the prison population
reported being asked for bribes by the police to move their
cases forward or receive better treatment while in jail.
Seventy percent of inmates admitted paying police officers
some form of bribe.57 In the poorest neighborhoods,
perceived levels of police integrity are extremely low. In
2005, researchers found that 88% of residents in the 12
barrios used as test cases for the Democratic Security Plan
reported skyrocketing police corruption over the last five
years. Even a year after the PSD was implemented, 70% of
those interviewed for the AmericasBarometer poll cited
police involvement in criminal acts, compared to only 30%
who thought the police were doing a good job protecting
people.58
Lack of trust in the police and other officials has its roots not
only in abuse and corruption, but also in the perceived and
documented involvement of functionaries in illicit and
criminal activities. Some scandals have appeared in the
media, but local residents know of many more. Recent
interviews reveal a public perception of involvement by
political candidates with drug traffickers to make money and
gain support within their communities. When these
candidates win elections, they maintain their links to illicit
and criminal actors in their localities. Citizens describe a
patron-client relationship between corrupt political
candidates, officials and drug traffickers. One resident put
the issue in these terms: “Politicians are the protector shield
of narcos…. They can‟t stop the narcos, because
narcotrafficking is political.”59 This type of opportunistic
relationship also exists between police officers and
57
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criminals: “They (the police) are speaking loud and clear
when they are in front of a client (criminal) who owes them.
They say, „Hey you, you did not pay me my part of the drugs
that you sold yesterday.‟”60 Many residents agree that “the
police receive a weekly income from the drug retailing
business, while the narcos use the official resources to
operate with impunity.” 61
The existence of a well-rooted, violent, illicit and nondemocratic institutional subculture embedded in the security
and judiciary sectors has obvious negative implications for
Dominican democracy. Pervasive practices such as these
tend to become ingrained in a society‟s systems of values
and institutional culture. For example, even though the
Dominican Republic occupies an intermediate position in
AmericasBarometer‟s ranking of countries whose nationals
admit being affected by acts of corruption (18%), citizen
perceptions of corruption put it in the highest position (78%),
above Mexico, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago. This
suggests that Dominicans care more about the type of
corruption that affects them indirectly – that is, high-level
corruption – than the petty bribery of traffic cops. At the
same time, however, 18% of Dominicans justified bribery
and the use of political influence for personal benefit,
suggesting that a segment of the population recognizes and
rewards the inefficiencies of the system. 62 The same study
also concludes that those who embrace the efficiency of less
democratic political systems perceive an increase in
corruption and feel insecure.63
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QUALIFYING DEMOCRACY: THE EMERGENCE OF
COMPETITIVE AUTHORITIES
The coexistence of old and new criminality in the barrios
gives rise to what can be described as criminogenic
ecosystems; that is, socioeconomic, political, cultural and
institutional arrangements that allow confluence, overlap and
conflict among licit and illicit, old and new, public and
private actors and activities. Statetropism and criminogenic
ecosystems affect the collective interest, social cohesion and
spatial structure of democracies and their constituencies.
They are fed by public frustration with justice and security
systems that give non-state actors a greater role in providing
protection and social goods. Criminogenic ecosystems
develop locally, in the most vulnerable areas, but often
project themselves in the national arena, where they intersect
at different levels with political, economic and bureaucratic
elites. They are facilitated by clientelistic practices that
often dovetail with normal and “legitimate” ways of doing
business among politicians and the private sector. A process
of adaptation occurs at the center of criminogenic
ecosystems, actively promoted by criminal actors and
embraced in haphazard and opportunistic ways by sectors of
the population.
Not all activities within the criminogenic ecosystem are
violent. With security a scarce and tradable commodity,
criminogenic clientelism relies on the cooptation of different
sources of insecurity, including the police itself. 64 These
64

In its more common expression, the practice of clientelism plays a vital
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adaptations have several consequences, among them shifts in
social practices that conflict with previously agreed upon
core values of morality and coexistence.
Growing
inequality, scarce income opportunities and the precarious
delivery and distribution of goods and services by local and
national authorities propel the blossoming of informal
activities. In this context, illicit activities, such as the sale of
stolen merchandise, become a part of the informal system of
self-provision of goods and services, within which drug
trafficking is just another economic activity, albeit one that is
intermittent and, undoubtedly, risky.
Of course, all informal activity is not necessarily illicit or
criminal.65
Interactions and exchanges among barrio
dwellers suggest ambivalence toward illegal activities such
as drug trafficking. On the one hand, many understand that
the involvement of young people and “decent” citizens in the
micro-market for drugs corrodes morale and collective
coexistence within the barrios and leads to the degradation
manifests itself in the incapacity of the state to arbiter among emergent
social actors (i.e., popular movements) and elites. It also helped defuse
the crisis of hegemony that preceded the recomposition of the political
elite. See Lozano, Después de los caudillos, 274-275. Without
pretending to project a Manichaean interpretation of clientelist practices,
I am more interested in understanding how this essential behavior of
Dominican political culture is also used as a functional tool for complex
criminality. Recognizing the ambitiousness of this argument, I maintain
that in the same way that traditional (formal and informal) politics
unfolds, this complex criminality not only relies on the use of violence,
but also on clientelism and prebendalism, especially in its state tropic
orientation. These links redefine the citizenry more in terms of clients
than citizens, using as its point of departure the flawed relationship
between the state and its citizens.
65
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and stigmatization of communities. On the other hand, the
dynamics of large-scale deprivation reproduce uneven
political and social configurations, resulting in the following
scenarios:


The normalization of the illicit. In the words of one
resident: “Drug trafficking, you see it daily, it is
normal. You will see places where it‟s so visible that
they identify themselves as businesses. One beside the
other, you will always see them on your way down the
street.”66



Drug trafficking as an informal economy. As another
resident pointed out, “Much of the cash that circulates
in Capotillo is linked to narcotrafficking. Those who
don't sell it have their own business, but everyone who
buys from that business does it with drug money, and
one way or another narcotrafficking reaps those
rewards (...) In fact, in the first few days after they
caught El Gringo (a drug dealer), that week there was a
recession in the neighborhood, so much so that
everyone was in bed by ten! You felt it.”67 According
to residents, the implications are that “The social
abandonment of many authorities and entities involved
in the management of these poor areas has left
everything up in the air. They have disconnected
themselves from society.
[There is a] lack of
education, of opportunity, and solutions for youth
unemployment.”68



Complex criminality as alternative governance. “Here
the narcotraffickers are like a more powerful presence
than the Dominican state. They [the drug dealers] defy
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the authorities; they are better armed than the military
and the national police together.”69


Criminogenic ecosystems as social service providers.
“They (drug dealers) are the first to respond to and
resolve the problems of people in the community when
something happens. They buy the coffin for the dead; if
there is a fire, they will throw water on it along with
everyone else. Dealers are like that, very engaged in
their community.”70

Both criminal ecosystems and statetropism take advantage of
and at the same time promote state disorganization, a
condition that fundamentally undermines democracy. As
residents note: “Drug traffickers are more organized than the
state. They are already supplanting the state in the positive
work and responsibilities that it is supposed to
accomplish.”71 “Due to the abuses being committed, the
tigüeres (hustlers) are getting riled up. Now there are strikes
and mobilizations organized by these social groups, by these
interests. Every time the DNCD (counter-narcotics
department) hits the streets there is a strike.”72
As these observations suggest, statetropism and criminogenic
ecosystems manifest the level of deterioration of state and
democratic legitimacy. This condition has reached the
dangerous point of opening niches allowing alternative
forces of governability to capture control in some territorial
areas and even within the state itself.
The next section of this essay considers how these dynamics
have reconfigured the relationship between the state, society
69
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and political system.
These rearrangements manifest
themselves in crucial changes in values. Even if they do not
result in authoritarian regressions, these dynamics have the
potential to become antisystemic forces that justify and
provide incentives for violence and alternative authority.
They express shifting alternatives to state presence through
symbiotic clientelistic relationship with violent and illicit
actors. For this reason, any attempt to strengthen the
democratic system in the Dominican Republic must
transcend formal institutional reforms and address the rapid
transformation of the nation‟s social fabric.
DOMINICAN DEMOCRACY IN CHANGING CONTEXTS
In recent decades, Dominican society has experienced
considerable change in the public and private realms. In
2008, the country‟s highest Human Empowerment Index
(HEI), as measured by the United Nations, was in the
metropolitan zones of Santo Domingo, the surrounding
National District and Santiago. HEI was twice as high in the
province of Santo Domingo and four times greater in the
National District than in the rest of the country. The
Collective Empowerment Index (CEI), however, was lower
in these two metropolitan areas. This uneven distribution of
opportunities, capacities and power is in itself conditioned by
social and political considerations, replicating multiple
inequities even in areas better positioned economically.73
73
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As of 2005, according to UN data, the country‟s integration
in the global economy had brought asymmetrical results for
the majority of the population. Despite economic growth of
between 5% and 8% since 1996, the majority of the
Dominican population has not substantially raised its
standard of living. In fact, the Dominican Republic is among
a small group of nations that has been unable to raise its
Index of Human Development (IHD) despite economic
growth, reflecting the ongoing incapacity of the Dominican
political elite to promote the well being of those it represents.
Not surprisingly, 90% of Dominicans the UN interviewed in
2008 said that political parties only defend the interests of
certain groups or their own organizations. The report
attributes the country‟s growing poverty and lagging human
development to the “sparse commitment of the political and
industrial national leadership to collective progress during
the last decades, as well as the absence of a social
empowerment pact with the majority of Dominican
society.”74
The absence of a social pact has led to sharpening social
inequality under the neoliberal policies implemented by
liberal and even populist governments. These strategies have
generated more poverty and reduced the ranks of the middle
class.
In 2010, two-thirds of Dominicans surveyed
considered the country‟s economic situation to be very bad,
despite the relatively favorable growth of the national
economy. The year before, Dominicans headed the list of

serve to strengthen people‟s capability to better take charge of and
improve their own human condition.” See UNDP, “Informe sobre
desarrollo humano, República Dominicana 2008: desarrollo humano, una
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2008).
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Latin Americans who reported serious difficulty meeting
their basic needs with the income they earned.75
At the same time as the neoliberal economic opening
heightened inequality, global trends accelerated Dominican
transnationalism through free trade zones, tourism,
migration, remittances and the growth of a services
economy.
All of these transnational factors created
opportunities for the country to enter the buoyant illicit
transnational economy, including the movement of drugs,
arms, money and people. Organized crime took advantage
of these conditions to create niches of corruption and
illegality. The expansion of the national drug trafficking
arena contributed to the formation of a micro-industrial drug
trade primarily (though not exclusively) in marginalized
barrios where legal alternatives for generating income are
scarce, especially for unemployed youth.
The abrupt emergence of these activities in the first few
years of the present century, as well as competition between
drug retail sites, incited a type of violence never before
experienced in Dominican society. As in the past,
governments deployed a mano dura strategy to mask the
structural and administrative disorganization of security
forces. Rather than curbing the violence, the state‟s response
further exacerbated it, as random collective raids in poor
neighborhoods led to the persecution and extermination of
individuals perceived to be delinquents.
Many poor
Dominicans viewed this reactive, punitive and socially
discriminatory approach as a state policy of social cleansing.
The police and armed forces returned to their Cold War
mode of eradicating “enemies of the state” wholesale.
Overall, the state‟s inability to control the new criminality
75
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highlighted the absence of preventive public policies to
control crime and insecurity. This trend changed somewhat
only in 2005, with the implementation of the Democratic
Security Plan.
CONCLUSIONS: DECONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNABILITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The beginning of this article cites the state‟s inability to
guarantee the rule of law as one of the critical challenges to
the Dominican democratic system.
As Dominican
sociologist Leopoldo Artiles argues, since independence the
Dominican state has been unable to “structure a state of
rights constitutionally backed and guided by a liberal
democratic constitution.”76 Despite democratization and
modernization, this problem persists today.
Complex processes of social, economic and political change
are defining the course of democratic development in the
country. The traditional adversarial relationship between
civil society, the political system and the state that
challenged the post-authoritarian transition is projected today
in more complex terms. The equally traditional lack of
separation between the public and the private (a trait
characteristic of the dictatorship period) is aggravated in the
twenty-first century by the cooptation of critical areas of the
state by unregulated and illicit private actors.
This
cooptation is propelled by: a) the readiness of organized
crime to take advantage of state resources by penetrating the
political sphere; b) a shrinking of the state and the transfer of
many of its responsibilities to non-state actors; c) the
emergence of parallel governability that contests democratic
rules by institutionalizing informal practices between private
and public actors; and d) the transmutation of traditional
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values as a result of adaptation and resilience to new
challenges to survival.
Today, major antagonism between political parties and civil
society is not only tied to politicians‟ abandonment of
rhetorical promises, but also to the parties‟ role in promoting
political, social and even criminal violence. Political parties
contribute implicitly or explicitly, as do other private
unregulated actors, to the deterioration of social welfare and
peaceful coexistence within socially excluded communities
and sectors of the Dominican population.
Each and every one of these developments impacts
Dominican democracy in unprecedented ways, raising a
number of questions: If not political parties, NGOs or the
traditional community leadership, who are the new
interlocutors in Dominican society? What political agendas,
if any, do these emerging actors defend? Whose interests do
they represent? What kind of institutional framework can
support the current links between society, the state and the
political arena? Given the disorganization of the state and
the fragmentation of interests, values and motivations within
society, what institutional resources beyond violence can the
state deploy to guide social change?
These questions suggest two hypotheses, both of which
require further study. First, in “young” democracies such the
Dominican Republic, the state struggles to impose or regain
its authority and legitimacy in areas of historical
abandonment. Other actors rival the state as “alternative
authorities” by providing services, goods and protection, and
use the informal economy and clientelistic networks to
construct a new social and spatial order and rules of
engagement. More than coercion and intimidation is
involved in these interplays; public adaptation and
acceptance also play a role in giving these actors new
legitimacy.
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A second hypothesis is that the state has been a passive
actor, allowing non-state actors to generate an alternative
governability through its propensity to surrender
responsibilities and functions to private actors (NGOs,
churches, community-based organizations, private security
firms) and those who circumvent public scrutiny (corrupt
police and military, drug traffickers, gangs, criminals).
In either case, reversing institutionalized practices such as
corruption, statetropism and anomic clientelism will require
more than mere institutional reform. Successful reform will
imply an understanding of how these processes manifest
themselves and inform official and informal institutions, as
well as the possible implications and outcomes of their
dissolution, especially in terms of political and social
vacuums they create. Finally, it is important to identify the
winners and losers in this asymmetrical competition.77
Reaching this level of comprehension could help
stakeholders and policy makers address problems through
more concrete and credible institutional transformations.

77

This argument elaborates on Merilee S. Grindle article, “Despite the
Odds: The Political Economy of Social Sector Reform in Latin America”
(Harvard University: KSG Faculty Research Working Papers Series
RWP01-021, January 2001.
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